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This article explores the gap between Arctic societal security discourse and tangible cli-
mate change commitments to Arctic Indigenous peoples in UN climate negotiations. The 
author argues that the space for and use of Arctic societal security discourses at COP21 
are not matched with climate commitments. Thus, the resulting global policy initiatives 
to support adaptation and mitigation in the North do not adequately support the security 
of current cultural practices and heritage in the Arctic. Empowering native culture of the 
North as a reason for acting on climate, but not empowering its security through tangible 
financial, legal, or technical commitments creates a post-colonial inequality in power in 




On December 8th, 2015 seven women from Alaska and Greenland mounted a stage in the 
Indigenous Pavilion of the 21st UN Climate Change Summit (COP21) to share songs, 
dances, and culture of their homeland (Kaljur 2015). They were in Paris, amongst a crowd 
of 40,000 people, to advocate for strong global action on climate change to save the Arctic 
from some of its most dramatic impacts (O’Rouke 2015). December 8th had been named 
Arctic Day at the Conference – a day where space and time were dedicated to Saami and 
Inuit leaders to celebrate the cultures of the Arctic and caution delegates about the needs 
for preserving it in a rapidly warming world. Throughout the day, representatives from 
across the region shared the cultural heritage at risk from climate change. Sami singer 
Sofia Jannok performed and spoke of climate change against a backdrop that read “WE 
ARE STILL HERE,” followed by a traditional dance performance by the Uummannaq 
Children. Later that evening, Elle Márjá Eira, an artist, filmmaker, singer, and reindeer 
herder from Finnmark, sung We Speak Earth. Altogether, the aim of Arctic Day at COP21 
was clear: to show the world the rich heritage of the circumpolar north that stands to be lost 
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if nothing is done to reduce global warming. “This is not a textbook for us,” Cathy Tow-
tongie, President of Nunavut Tunngavik warns the crowd. “This is our way of life” 
(Kaljur 2015).    
Four days later, the world listened. The Paris Agreement, the product of two 
decades of work by members of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
set countries on a path to hold the increase in global average temperature to well below 
2 degrees Celsius, and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 degrees, 
recognizing that this would significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change 
(UNFCCC 2015). To accomplish this, Paris created the foundation for a consistent flow 
of finances to help developing and least developed countries lower greenhouse gas 
emissions while simultaneously growing their economies. Beyond mitigation, the 
Agreement also envisioned a world where ample financial and technical resources 
would be made available to increase resiliency and augment adaptation efforts on the 
front lines of climate change. But while this global target to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions ensures a reduction in the severity of future climate impacts in the Arctic, the 
Agreement makes no mention of the region directly, nor of the consequences happening 
today that can no longer be avoided. “[The agreement] was historic, yes,” said Okalik 
Eegeesiak, Chair of the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC) to Radio Canada International 
in the days after returning from Paris. “[But] Inuit and Saami peoples wanted to have 
more recognition and respect for Arctic peoples,” she said in a phone interview. “There 
is some mention of indigenous peoples and our rights and our role in climate change 
[issues] but there isn’t much commitment to work with us” (Quinn 2015).  
In UN climate change conferences, there exists a disconnect between the space 
for and use of Arctic cultural heritage as a catalyst for action and parallel international 
legal and financial support for climate adaptation and mitigation in the North. This article 
aims to unpack the gap between creating a space for societal security discourse and pro-
ducing tangible climate commitments to Arctic Indigenous peoples in UN climate nego-
tiations. After a brief introduction to its foundational scholarship, the article first surveys 
and explores visual and textual narratives pertaining to Arctic heritage at COP21 focusing 
on regional Indigenous political organizations and representatives. The narrative analysed 
emerges at the nexus of climate and culture, and contends both that societal security is to 
maintain Arctic indigenous culture in its traditional state and that societal security is to 
protect indigenous culture from harm or destruction while allowing it to live, change and 
develop in its own accord to assist with climate mitigation and adaptation actions. The 
article then turns to the resulting Paris Agreement and Paris Road Map to survey specific 
legal, financial, and policy support mechanisms for Arctic Indigenous peoples. The article 
will argue that the space for and use of Arctic Indigenous societal security discourses at 
COP21 are uneven with the resulting global policy initiatives, and do not adequately sup-
port the security of current cultural practices and heritage in the Arctic. It contends that 
empowering native culture of the North as a reason for acting on climate, but not empow-
ering its security through tangible financial, legal, or technical commitments creates a 
Politik  Nummer 3 | Årgang 20 | 2017 
 
 67 
post-colonial inequality in power in societal security discourses and commitments. Over-
all, the article aims to fill a gap in current scholarship on the nexus of security, Arctic 
identity, and climate change in order to better understand the interaction of societal secu-
rity and scales of identity at UN climate change negotiations.  
 
Conceptual Framework of Societal Security and The Arctic Citizen  
 
Of all the dimensions of the recent model of ‘comprehensive’ security, societal security 
is perhaps the softest and most elusive of its iterations. In the Copenhagen School which 
Wæver founded and wherein the concpept of societal security finds its origin, security is 
not a static concept but rather a changing phenomenon influenced by international devel-
opments in conflict, economy, identity, and politics, among others. Societal security is no 
exception to this. It is complex and ambiguous, in no small part because it is dynamic and 
depends on so many factors. Societal security is “the defence of an identity against a 
perceived threat, or more precisely, the defence of a community against a perceived threat 
to its identity” (Wæver 2008, 581). Here, the identity of the community, rather than the 
sovereignty of the state, is the value, or referent object, that is being protected. This deep-
ening and complementation of the idea of security to include issues of identity, and in 
turn culture and heritage, necessitates a brief unfolding of the concept of identity, how it 
relates to security, and what the nexus of identity and security means in the multi-state 
and multi-national space of the Arctic. Identity can be understood in relation to Benedict 
Anderson’s seminal works on imagined communities and nations, where nations are a 
socially constructed community imagined by the people who perceive themselves as part 
of that group (Anderson 1991). Here, the community and its shared identity is imagined 
because “members of the nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet 
them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion” 
(Anderson 1991, 49). Individuals construct a stretchable net of kinship that allows for, 
and is built upon, a shared identity, history, and culture. As Gellner argues, “Nationalism 
is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not 
exist” (Gellner 2008).1 
It is within this space of nation, of constructed shared identities, that the concep-
tualization of the ‘Arctic Citizen’ is born in the global climate change science and risk 
discourse. In Marybeth Long Martello’s Global Change Science and the Arctic Citizen, 
she proposes that climate change has given birth to the development of a new type of 
                                                
1 Societal security and the use of identity, as opposed to state sovereignty, as the referent object does have 
its opponents. Early on, scholar Bill McSweeney (1998, 137) argued that identity does not have an empirical 
base upon which to lean, and is either an act, whereupon identity relates to the ability of individuals to 
uphold the narrative about them as a collective self, or a structure, wherein identity relates to the story from 
which the individuals attempt to build an identity. In this reading, identity is understood as a process and 
not as an object to be secured. In response, Wæver and Buzan (reference is lacking) have attempted to 
demonstrate that social communities defined in terms of identity can become a reference object in some 
events of securitization in which the value that is being protected is not the sovereignty of state but rather 
the identity of community.  
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political, identity-based actor in the North (Martello 2004). Martello proposes that by 
weaving together generational knowledge and social agenda setting across tribes, Indig-
enous groups have constructed and adopted a new imagined identity, and in turn empow-
ered this identity as an emerging regional policy community. This type of identity can be 
seen as a combination of the nation (an imagined community) as defined by possessing 
compact, well-defined territories at their homeland, a land that acts as a repository of 
historic memories and associations, the place where ‘our’ sages and heroes lived and 
fought, and nation as predominately defined by ethnicity. Adopting the Societal Security 
approach of the Copenhagen School, Arctic Indigenous organizations and community 
representatives can come to define their own identity independent of (and at times in 
opposition to) the political state within which they are located (Wæver 1993, 23). Indeed, 
the legitimacy of the state is neither exclusively nor necessarily founded on social iden-
tity, but Arctic Indigenous actors can create currency in the international arena through 
establishing an independent social identity. Closely linked to constructivism and devel-
oped around Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver’s conceptualization of security, societal secu-
rity is “about the large, self-sustaining identity groups” of the collective identities of so-
cieties which share a common “we-feeling” (Buzan et al. 1998, 119). Here, the state is 
not the focal action in the international security framework, but instead a group of people 
who share a common identity. As Buzan explains, “Society is about identity, the self-
conception of communities and of individuals identifying themselves as members of a 
community. These identities are distinct from, although often entangled with, the explic-
itly political organizations concerned with government” (Buzan et al. 1998, 119). Here, 
the Arctic Citizen, the imagined community of the North and its shared identity, are built 
on the idea that the circumpolar north has been their homeland since time immemorial, 
where legendary heroes like Kiviuq, an eternal Inuit wanderer, lived and travelled. Their 
identity, and in turn societal security, is not tied to the Western concept of a state with 
hard borders and a sovereignty to be secured. Rather, the Arctic Citizen’s identity is tied 
to the landscapes of the Arctic, indigenousness, and the ethnic distinction they possess as 
being direct descendants from the original inhabitants of the North. In the societal security 
framework, this identity is the referent object that is being secured, not any one Arctic 
state.   
As climate science regionalizes the Arctic, it has simultaneously underwritten 
an Arctic identity centred on the notion that its peoples comprise an at-risk community. 
Science, and in turn the policy community, treat the Arctic as a single unit under pressure 
from a variety of global forces. In analysing how native peoples construct their own po-
litical agency through different strategies to further their own political interests in the 
Arctic, Monica Tennberg furthers Martello’s work to find that Indigenous political 
agency is based on multiple forms of power and activist leaders’ ability to change the 
structure of power relations to create space for their own political agency (Tennberg 
2010). Through the emergence of a regional identity, the voice of this new citizen has 
been recognized as an important part of knowledge creation of socio-ecological changes 
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of the region’s systems, providing a certain level of agency on the part of the Arctic Cit-
izen that allows their voice to be heard through regional Indigenous organizations. Rather 
than people being passive victims, as they had been before, the Arctic Climate Impact 
Assessment (ACIA) depicts them as adaptive beings and holders of knowledge, so that 
they come to embody a dual identity of victim and expert. This has resulted in changing 
approaches to knowledge formation, mapmaking, and the quantification of climate 
change, including ACIA successfully privileging the Indigenous experience in the north 
by including new approaches to knowledge production, detailed accounts of Indigenous 
communities, provision of heightened public visibility, and, consequently, strengthened 
their agency in climate change issues. (Martello 2008).  
Societal security in the Arctic relates to the capabilities of the “Arctic Citizen” 
to “preserve its essential characteristics in the face of variable circumstances and despite 
the potential or actual threat” (Hough 2004, 106). Societal insecurity, then, exists when 
communities of any kind identify a threat to their survival as a community (Wæver 2008, 
582). In societal security theoretical scholarship, threats are either horizontal competition, 
such as migrations, or vertical competitions, such as integrations and secessions (Wæver 
2008, 583). The vast majority of societal security scholarship focuses on these two types 
of threats in ethnic conflicts, minority rights, immigration, regionalism, separatism, and 
anti-Western nationalism and rhetoric. Significantly less developed is the notion that cli-
mate change poses a threat to societal security. When climate change is addressed in the 
Copenhagen School, it is almost entirely within the environmental security strand. But 
environmental threats to societies can occur, especially when identity is tied to a particu-
lar territory and culture is adapted to a way of life that is strongly conditioned by its 
natural surroundings. Threats to the environment, whether they be deforestation, pollu-
tion, or climate change, can endanger the existence of that culture, and in turn the society 
to which it belongs (Roe 2010, 220). Of course, these dimensions cannot adequately ad-
dress the issues of security separately; each of the sectors Wæver and Buzan lay out affect 
each other in real life, and climate change, like many threats, involve a combination of 
them. If we are to understand climate change as a threat, or at least a threat multiplier, to 
other strands – economic, ecological, political, and military – then we must also untangle 
climate change as a threat to societal security. 
A subsidence-based way of life that is close to traditional land is central to 
Northern Indigenous groups’ cultural identities. Arctic society’s identity focuses on 
an intimate dependence on traditional methods for hunting and fishing, housing, sharing 
of food, and travel on snow and ice, among many others. This provides a long-estab-
lished spiritual and cultural communal existence through an intimate relationship with 
their surroundings. Even the development of northern indigenous languages is inti-
mately connected with ice, land, sky, and wildlife. But as climate and geophysical 
changes occur with warmer temperatures, performing basic tasks vital for both food and 
cultural development, like hunting trips, are becoming not only challenging, but also 
dangerous with thinner, less stable ice. Some traditional travel routes to camp sites, 
neighbouring communities, and hunting and fishing areas have become unreachable. A 
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changing climate also has implications for the passage of traditional knowledge from 
one generation to the next, particularly their weather predicting skills. Their weather 
and climate-related knowledge of hunting conditions from cloud and wind pattern ob-
servations do not fit with today’s changing climate. Many villages across the North are 
heavily reliant on subsidence lifestyle activities based around Arctic waters, including 
the Chukchi Sea, Baffin Bay, and the Northwest Passage. However, the massive thin-
ning of ice sheets and glaciers have negatively impacted the abundance and distribution 
of Arctic wildlife species, including the ringed seal, salmon, walruses, and caribou, 
many of which will be pushed to extinction by 2070–2090 (Watt-Cloutier 2004). In 
addition to less access to wildlife and flora like berries for collection, changes in see ice 
thickness and distribution, permafrost conditions, and extreme weather events also in-
crease risks for personal injury. Food storage is also being undermined by climate 
change. Traditionally, outdoor meat caches were used to keep community food fresh 
and preserved in the cold. Today, these traditional storage methods are no longer viable, 
as higher temperatures spoil communal preserves. There is also the potential that cli-
mate change could increase human exposure to contaminants like organic pollutants, 
heavy metals, and radionuclides through shifting air and water currents. 
Across the Arctic region, Indigenous communities have effectively bolstered 
their capacity to conserve native languages, diets, and traditions in spite of many changing 
conditions. But melting sea ice, shoreline erosion, and forest fires are endangering socie-
tal security by threatening the continuation of a culture that has survived and thrived for 
millennia. If a society loses its unique identity, it cannot survive as a society. There are 
many actors involved in securing Indigenous cultural heritage in the face of a changing 
climate, including the United Nations, national governments, and non-governmental or-
ganizations. The most vocal and effective of these actors are Arctic Indigenous organiza-
tions and Arctic communities themselves. The section to follow uses Arctic Day at 
COP21 as a case study to examine the types of narratives constructed by and about the 
Arctic Citizen at UN climate negotiations. It then turns to a textual analysis of the Paris 
Agreement and auxiliary texts to survey how and to what extent the Arctic Citizen is 
included in the resulting documents. The article finally returns to the conceptual frame-
work laid out here to analyse how the Paris Agreement addresses, or does not address, 
societal security of the Arctic Citizen. 
 
The Arctic Citizen at COP21 
 
The use of Arctic visuals as the iconic imagery and symbolism of climate change has 
been well documented (Manzo 2010). Surveys show that circumpolar visual imagery like 
polar bears and retreating ice act as emotional anchors or referents to an otherwise abstract 
phenomenon, and as such are widely circulated and reproduced. In the words of Vidal, 
“It’s the age of the melt… when the stranded polar bear becomes the symbol of the times.” 
(Vidal 2008). The symbolism of the Arctic at COP21 was no exception to this. ‘Ice 
Watch’ at the Place de la Republique invited visitors to walk around blocks of ice from 
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Greenland, watching as the natural sculptures melted before their very eyes. The instal-
lation, by Greenlandic geologist Minik Rosing and Icelandic-Danish artist Olafur Eli-
asson, was meant to “make the climate change we are facing tangible” and ‘inspire shared 
commitment to take climate action” (Walker 2015). Further down the road, Greenpeace’s 
three-tone mechanical polar bear, Aurora, marched towards Le Bourget Conference Cen-
ter. While these more recognizable visual narratives that exhibited the power of the polar 
bear icon to represent climate change in the minds of the public were present, a parallel 
narrative – one that was both complementary to and in contention with the polar bear 
narrative – was also employed in Paris.  
In effect, the intent of COP21 Arctic Day was to provide an alternative visual 
narrative of the Arctic in a rapidly changing climate – a narrative defined not by polar 
bears and ice but by the richness of the human experience in the circumpolar north. In the 
words of Inuit Circumpolar Chair Okalik Eegeesiak as she presented in the Indigenous 
Pavilion on December 8th, “Stop using the polar bear as an icon for climate change. This 
does not help us address the very real human dimension. Same with the seals” (Kaljur 
2015). But beyond the reorienting of narratives from mega fauna to humans, if considered 
within the comprehensive security framework provided by the Copenhagen School, 
COP21’s Arctic Day’s intent and rhetoric were rooted in notions of societal security. As 
defined by Buzan and Wæver, society itself is “about identity, the self-conception of 
communities and of individuals identifying themselves as members of a community” 
(Buzan et al. 1998, 119). In a full day of programming, Arctic Indigenous representatives 
at COP21 presented themselves as a single, pan-regional society through cultural perfor-
mances and informational presentations. The structure of the event was built upon a two-
fold societal security foundation: (1) that the Arctic Citizen and Arctic society has a re-
silient ability to persist in its essential character in the face of political, economic, and 
colonial/post-colonial threats; and (2) that the Arctic Citizen and Arctic society is unable 
to persist in its essential character under changing ecological conditions and threats of a 
rapidly changing homeland that are exacerbated by land rights and imperialist policies.  
Arctic Day was the production of both a visual and oral narratives of a culture 
at risk as a means to construct an imagined community, as seen through its schedule: 
 
11.00-12.05 Film Screening: ”Last Yoik of the Saami Forest” 
12.10-14.10 Film Screening: ”Inuk” 
14.15-15.45 Film Forum by Saami Film Institute: 7 Saami Stories & 
Stoerre Vaerie 
14.15-15.45 Joiking Workshop – We speak Earth by Áslat Holmberg 
15.45-15.50 Dance performance by Uummannaq Children 
16.00-16.15 Ted X talk on Climate Change by Sofia Jannok 
16.15-17.45 Panel Session: Climate Knowledge and Solutions from 
Arctic Voices With Okalik Eegeesiak, Aili Keskitalo, 
Cathy Towtongie, Reggie Joule and Maatalii Okalik 
17.45-18.45 Saami concert by Elle Márjá Eira 
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Notably, Arctic Day’s narrative is an evolution of external threats to Arctic Indigenous 
identity and culture that begins with state discrimination and post-colonial legacies that 
are then woven into current insecurities of a changing climate for Arctic society. The 
opening film, “Last Yoik of the Saami Forest,” chronicles the logging damage that has 
taken place in the forests of Finnish Lapland over the past 50 years (Documentary Edu-
cational Resources). The Northern old growth forests therein are essential to Saami rein-
deer herding and their traditional way of life, but have been severely deforested by the 
state-owned logging company Metsahalltus. The consequence put forth in the film is the 
Saami fears that it will not be able to live as itself with its distinctive characteristics and 
dynamics once its landscapes are changed. While this threat to societal security is not one 
put forth by Buzan in his work – migration, horizontal competition, or vertical competi-
tion to a society’s culture and cohesion2 changing the landscapes provides the same threat 
to cultural heritage and identity. The focus on environmental degradation and its effects 
on identity offers a transition to climate change as a threat to the survival of the Arctic 
community as a cohesive unit. The film Inuk then acts as the bridge between environmen-
tal and climatic threats to identity. Inuk is a coming-of-age story of 16-year old Gaaba 
Petersen, who was raised in Nuuk and sent to Uummannaq Orphanage, a foster home in 
the North, after his parents are unable to care for him due to alcoholism (Inuk 2014). 
While in the North, Gaaba is sent to a bear hunter to learn the wisdom of his people, and 
in this journey into manhood where seal hunts replace video games, he encounters the 
effects of global warming.  
For the remainder of the day, the cultural richness of the Arctic Citizen’s identity 
and climate change as a threat to that societal security are interlaced through dance per-
formances by Uummannaq Children, talks on climate change in the North, vocal perfor-
mances that ‘speak for the earth,’ and conversations about climate knowledge and solutions 
to a rapidly changing landscape. Arctic Day buttressed two concepts. First, that societal se-
curity in the Arctic, as theorized generally by Wæver, is not tied to a state territory. Rather, 
the large-scale collective identity of Indigenous peoples to the circumpolar north function 
independent of the state. Together, Inuit leaders from across the region drafted and pre-
sented a joint declaration on climate change in the Arctic — “to send a united message to 
the world, to recognize and support the special challenges that climate change poses for 
Arctic peoples and the right to development in the Arctic,” noted then Minister of Labor, 
Finance, Ministerial Resources, and Foreign Affairs Vittus Qujaukitsoq on December 8th. 
“Our joint Inuit voice and our traditional know-how from across the Arctic should be 
heard and included in international policy-making. Most importantly, Arctic indigenous 
peoples have to be ensured equal access to the right to development. Indigenous peoples’ 
rights and interests must be included in the COP21 outcome document” (Walker 2015; 
Governments of Nunavut and Greenland, and Inuit Circumpolar Council 2015).  
                                                
2 To be sure, Arctic Indigenous communities have faced these external threats to their identity and culture. 
As described by Inuit Circumpolar Council Chair Okalik Eegeesiak at COP21 “Despite all odds, we are 
still here.” 
Politik  Nummer 3 | Årgang 20 | 2017 
 
 73 
Perhaps the societal insecurity brought about by a changing climate is captured in an 
interview that lle Márjá Eira, the final performer of Arctic Day, did with Snowriders In-
ternational while at COP21. On camera and in her performance on the evening of Decem-
ber 8th, she spoke of how a warmer world is impacting her and her family’s identity in the 
small Saami village. 
 
“My family works with reindeers and climate changes is affecting 
us personally because if the snow disappears then our way of living 
disappears. It’s our tradition, and we’re gonna have a lot of prob-
lems herding the reindeer, and the reindeers will also struggle. And 
I’m afraid that if the snow disappears then will the Saami people 
also disappear, our traditions and our language? That’s why I’m 
here using my voice, by showing my films, talking to people, and 
also through music. It’s important to use your voice and tell about 
us, even when we are not invited to the grand conference” (Snowrid-
ers International 2015). 
 
lle Márjá Eira presents her and her family’s identity as a part of the collective Arctic 
societal identity on a lower scale. Identities are inherently multi-layered based on an in-
dividual’s lived and inherited experiences. Gender, economic class, marital status, and 
religion are just a few of the many layers an individual can perform within their identity, 
while scales, from the identity of a resident of a specific village to Arctic Citizen to In-
digenous, all the way up to a member of humankind, add yet another layer to identity. 
Each of these different scales of identity are multiple, overlapping, and at time in conten-
tion with one another (Tsing 2000). The identity narratives and societal insecurities pre-
sented here are no different. The Arctic Citizen identity was the primary identity pro-
posed, but it was inevitably combined with other scales of identity that were being prac-
ticed, and evaded. Saami, Inuit, Canadian, Greenlandic, American, Alaska, European, 
Indigenous, and the list goes on. Arctic Day at COP21 transcended these multiple and 
contested scales of identities, to present a singular, shared narrative of a threatened, cul-
turally-unique in a full day of dance, film screenings, songs, and speakers on at-risk cul-
tural heritage and social safety nets.   
Nonetheless, the space for Arctic Indigenous actors to present societal insecurity 
at COP21 did not translate into textual legal and financial commitments to security for 
the Arctic Citizen. This is not to say that there have not been other significant advances 
in the recognition of Arctic Indigenous agency and voices. The Permanent Participants 
of the Arctic Council and scientific research reports like the Arctic Climate Impact As-
sessment hold testament to this. However, the final text of the Paris Agreement does not 
make mention of the Arctic region or their insecurities nor do other parallel documents 
like the Adaptation Fund or the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage 
from the Effects of Climate Change. While the Arctic Citizen was present and active 
discursively in Paris, they were not represented in its result.  




The Gap between Physical and Textual Spaces at COP21  
 
Paris was a high-level negotiation that established broad strategies for mitigating green-
house gas emissions and adapting to the consequences, historic emissions have generated 
through the Paris Agreement. The development of the Paris Agreement since 2015 has 
focused on creating a practical plan for climate action by answering the question of how 
to actually limit temperatures to “well below” two degrees; how governments of devel-
oped countries will concretely help those on the front lines of a rapidly changing envi-
ronment; and what breakthrough innovations are needed to transform the global econ-
omy to be resilient, equitable, and carbon neutral. While the rules for the Paris Agree-
ment’s implementation are set to be finalized by 2018, with the next big climate policy 
milestone in 2020 when each country will put forward an enhanced national climate 
plan, the Paris Agreement itself and the roadmap to the rulebook provide a number of 
mechanisms to address societal security (Darby et al. 2016). These include climate fi-
nance, the adaptation fund, and the Warsaw International Mechanism on Loss and Dam-
age.   
Why are the narratives and space for discourses of Arctic Indigenous culture and 
identity at COP21 not paralleled in the resulting agreement? While there exists an 
acknowledgement and empowerment of Indigenous actors as knowledge-holders and 
contributors, current scholarship stops short of analysing the lack of legal and political 
instruments that might be employed to achieve the societal security advocated specifically 
by the ‘Arctic Citizen.’ Current scholarship offers two possibilities for the lack of tangible 
instruments to support Arctic Indigenous cultures in a changing climate. The first is the 
“slipperiness” or “softness” of the concept of culture itself, and therefore an inability to 
effectively secure something as dynamic and amorphous as culture (Forrest 2004). As 
noted by Scott Forrest at the Northern Research Forum in Yellowknife in 2004: 
 
“The boundaries of culture are of course permeable and dynamic, 
which exacerbates the difficulty of “securing” them, particularly 
through legal protection. Once you define and prescribe what you 
want to protect, you create artificial permanence and inhibit the nat-
ural change that defines a living culture. Living cultures are at once 
persistent in that the course of the river is relatively unwavering, but 
at the same time the water moving through it is always in motion. 
The inherent tension between permanence and dynamic change lies 
at the heart of placing culture within the framework of security.” 
 
Because of this difficulty to articulate the concept of identity into a form where it can be 
effectively ‘secured’ through political and legal means, the pursuit of indigenous societal 
security has often been advanced under the guise of biodiversity, sustainability, and en-
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vironmental security. This has occurred by borrowing similar justifications and argu-
ments from the biodiversity discourse, by promoting idealized images of indigenous peo-
ples resource managers, and through strategic alliances between indigenous peoples and 
environmental NGOs. This grafting of science narratives onto cultural identity to foster 
political agency is a concept picked up by Michael Bravo in Voices from the Sea Ice. As 
Bravo explores how climate change narratives have shaped notions of Arctic Citizenship, 
he finds that the vocabulary of ecological risk, which enjoys widespread currency in po-
litical discussion about climate change, has constructed an Arctic Citizen that is visible 
but voiceless (Bravo 2009). He concludes that northern communities have largely em-
braced this new notion of citizenship in order to monopolize on the agency imbued in 
regional victims, but that these voices are often masked by the southern produced narra-
tives themselves. 
However, when these arguments are graphed onto the proceedings of the UN-
FCCC and COP21, they fall short of explaining why Arctic society is left insecure. Non-
economic assets of society – the shared historic sites and cultural heritage that buttress 
identity and societal cohesion – are secured in UNFCCC frameworks. For example, 
UNESCO, the UN organization responsible for coordinating international cooperation in 
education, science, culture, and communication, serves on the Adaptation Fund Board as 
a Multilateral Implementing Entity. The Adaptation Fund was created in 2001 (the last 
time the Conference of the Parties was in Marrakesh) to support adaptation projects in 
developing countries. It was originally tied to the soon-to-expire Kyoto Protocol, the last 
big international agreement linked to the UNFCCC that committed parties to binding 
emission reduction targets. Since its establishment, the Fund has financed $358 million 
of mostly small-scale projects to help communities’ adaptation to the effects of climate 
change we can no longer avoid (World Bank Ground 2016). Developing countries have 
largely applauded the Fund as a success, and in particular its direct access structure that 
allows accredited countries to manage their own projects. Such a structure allows devel-
oping countries to have a sense of ownership as the majority share of the Fund’s govern-
ing board seats. The Adaptation Fund sought $80 million to finance projects already in 
place ahead of the meeting in Marrakesh, which was fulfilled by European commitments. 
As a Multilateral Implementing Entity, the culture-based organization is able to serve 
“vulnerable countries by directly working with them to address their requests and needs, 
while collaborating and mobilizing the necessary resources and partners for effective lo-
cal implementation on the ground” (UNESCO 2016).  
In addition to UNESCO’s participation in the Adaptation Fund, the Warsaw In-
ternational Mechanism on Loss and Damage, associated with Climate Change Impacts’ 
work on noneconomic loss and damage, also challenges the slippery argument of culture. 
In 2013, Parties of the Conference established the Warsaw Mechanism to promote the 
implementation of approaches to address loss and damage, including the non-economic 
losses like historic sites, cultural heritage, tradition, and identity (United Nations 
2017). In its first two years, the Warsaw Mechanism established a number of expert 
groups, like that on non-economic losses, that are working to enhance data on and 
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knowledge of losses associated with the adverse effects of climate change, and identify 
ways forward for reducing the risk of addressing losses with specific focus on potential 
impacts within regions. One of the most concrete actions to come out of COP22 in Mar-
rakesh was the approval of a five-year work plan on loss and damage, to begin in 2017 
under the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism. Moving for-
ward, this work plan will guide countries in formally addressing topics like slow-onset 
impacts of climate change, climate-induced migration, and non-economic losses and 
damage – including culture, historic sites, traditions, and identity (United Nations 2016).  
However, none of these internationally-based climate change instruments can 
be used by Arctic Citizens. While other sub-societal identities are acknowledged within 
the Paris Agreement and auxiliary documents like the Warsaw International Mechanism, 
developed and developing societies based on the economic status of their state is the priv-
ileged identity scale at UNFCCC negotiations. The term ‘Arctic’ does not appear in the 
text of the Paris Agreement, and Indigenous peoples are only acknowledged twice for 
their particular vulnerabilities, knowledges, and rights, in its preamble and in Article 7.5.3 
Neither of these references come with particular actions; rather, they are merely acknowl-
edgements. By contrast, there are 49 references to developing and least developed coun-
tries with stronger language. For example, in Article 5, “Support shall be provided to 
developing country Parties for the implementation of this Article, in accordance with Ar-
ticles 9, 10 and 11, recognizing that enhanced support for developing country Parties will 
allow for higher ambition in their actions.”  
The elusiveness of identity and culture as the foundational concepts upon which 
societal security rests are general difficulties when addressing insecurities; however, it is 
clear that non-economic assets and non-tangible losses have been considered in the UN-
FCCC and while drafting the Paris Agreement. A third explanation may illuminate an 
important addition to the framework of understanding Arctic societal security at COP21, 
namely, an explanation based on privileged scales of identity in UNFCCC negotiations 
and decision-making. The two examples of societal security, and specifically non-eco-
nomic assets associated with societal identity, use the identity scale of the sovereign state 
to provide assistance. The Paris Agreement and the UNFCC generally divide the world 
                                                
3“Acknowledging that climate change is a common concern of humankind, Parties should, when taking 
action to address climate change, respect, promote and consider their respective obligations on human 
rights, the right to health, the rights of indigenous peoples, local communities, migrants, children, persons 
with disabilities and people in vulnerable situations and the right to development, as well as gender equal-
ity, empowerment of women and intergenerational equity.” 
“Article 7.5. Parties acknowledge that adaptation action should follow a country-driven, gender-respon-
sive, participatory and fully transparent approach, taking into consideration vulnerable groups, communi-
ties and ecosystems, and should be based on and guided by the best available science and, as appropriate, 
traditional knowledge, knowledge of indigenous peoples and local knowledge systems, with a view to in-
tegrating adaptation into relevant socioeconomic and environmental policies and actions, where appropri-
ate.”  
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into developed and developing countries, wherein developed countries provide finan-
cial, technical, and political assistance in mitigation, adaptation, and damage efforts in 
developing states. There is a disadvantage to understanding climate change policy in 
this way for the societal insecurities of the Arctic Citizens, as it makes invisible the 
developing communities within developed states, those who are both on the front lines 
of rapid climate change and are at the periphery of both the political and financial ge-
ographies of their countries. Although the effects of climate change know no borders, 
international climate negotiations have long held an established, inelastic geopolitical 
map. Since the founding days of the Conference of the Parties, the world cartography 
of climate policy has been drawn into three blocs: the developed, the developing, and 
the least developed worlds. The founding document of the COPs, the UNFCCC, pro-
posed at the 1992 Rio Earth Summit and ratified by 194 parties in 1994, called for 
“common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities” to reduce coun-
try emissions” (United Nations 2016). Until COP21 in 2015, developing countries led 
by China argued that they should not be held to the same limits on emissions as devel-
oped countries because of historical emissions by developed countries and their own 
development needs. Because of historic inequalities and the persistence of extreme pov-
erty in many developing countries, climate justice became tied to allowing developing 
economies to make a slower transition away from carbon-intensive, cheaper fuels while 
requiring developed countries to make deeper emission cuts first.  
 
Arctic Societal Security as a Missed Scale 
 
As the Paris Agreement and tangential meetings and negotiations focus on global trans-
formations and vulnerabilities and finances support needs of developing countries, eco-
logically, socio-economically, and politically vulnerable communities in developed 
countries like the Arctic become obscured. But the Arctic is warming twice as fast as 
the rest of the globe from a process known as polar or Arctic amplification (ACIA 
2005). And this amplified warming at the pole means that limiting global warming to 2 
degrees Celsius will result in a 4 degree increase in the circumpolar north (Mooney and 
Samenow 2016). Arctic leaders at COP21 were aware of this privileging of devel-
oped/developing identity over the Arctic’s regional or Indigenous societal identity 
within the texts. “We keep reminding our respective governments that Inuit, Saami and 
northern indigenous Peoples should be considered underdeveloped communities,” Ee-
geesiak noted at Arctic Day. “We will be going after the funds that were announced as 
well” (Kaljur 2015). Nonetheless, in spite of statements like these, the text of the Paris 
Agreement still makes no tangible guarantees to the Arctic Citizen as a community en-
tirely within developed states. Revisiting the definition of societal security, “the capacity 
of a society to conserve its specific character in spite of changing conditions and real or 
virtual threats” (Forrest 2004, 1), the Paris Agreement and UN programs related to 
COP21 do not provide Arctic society with the financial or technical resources to fulfil 
this capacity. The opportunities offered by the Adaptation Fund, the Warsaw International 
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Mechanism, or the Paris Agreement deliver the financial means for societies in develop-
ing and least developed countries to preserve their essential characteristics in the face of 
climate change. The Arctic Citizen, however, is left a space to voice their needs for inter-
national agreements and programs to address Arctic societal security, but not any means 
to address their insecurities.  
In the shadow of the US Presidential Election, the 22nd Conference of the Par-
ties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) took 
place in November 2016. More commonly known as COP22, the conference brought 
country delegations from around the world to Marrakesh, Morocco, in an effort to move 
humanity forward in curbing global warming. Like COP21, COP22 failed to translate 
the discourse around Arctic societal insecurities into tangible commitments. There were 
two Arctic Days at COP22, one held at the Nordic Pavilion on November 12th, and one 
held at the US Pavilion titled The Melting Arctic – a glimpse into the future of global 
climate change, held as part of their Arctic Council 2015-2017 Chairmanship on No-
vember 11th. Both of these events highlighted the challenges of living in a rapidly 
changing North, though, importantly, neither featured Indigenous representation and 
neither focused on identity as the organizing concept. Each Arctic Day spoke to the 
threats global climate change brings to traditional Arctic cultures, historic livelihoods, 
and safety, with a focus on the physical impacts of climate change on communities. 
Scientists, policymakers, and researchers spoke about the insecurities climate change is 
bringing to Arctic communities. And yet, Marrakesh followed in COP21’s footsteps in 
its privileging of state scales of identity over sub-national societies. With no specific 
legal, financial, or technical assistance from the UN, Arctic Citizens as a sub-national 
identity still face threats to their survival as a community as the region warms (Wæver 
2008, 582).  
Providing a space for Arctic Citizens to voice these security threats to society 
is important, but does not reify Arctic Indigenous society as an independent social agent 
endowed with the agency to have their sub-state identity as Arctic Citizens, within de-
veloped countries, to be acknowledged and protected in the negotiations themselves. 
This in turn, as argued by this article, leaves the Arctic Citizen unable to ‘defend’ their 
identity in the face of climate change through any of the available international climate 
policy or finance mechanisms. The UN Conference of the Parties Process will continue 
onward from COP22 long into the future. Delegates from Parties of the Paris Agreement 
will work to limit future greenhouse gas emissions and to safeguard the least abled 
amongst humanity to adapt to the already locked-in effects of a warming world. This 
article provides a foundation for understanding the interactions of societal security and 
scales of identity at UN climate change negotiations by examining what societal security 
is for the Arctic Citizen, where the Arctic fits into UN climate change negations, and what 
the ultimate texts reveal about the Arctic’s inclusion in global action on climate change 
adaptation, mitigation, and loss and damage work. But this survey should serve as just 
that – an exploration upon which future research can build to understand, analyse, and 
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ultimately address the gap between societal security rhetoric and climate action at the top 
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